Restricted Quantification over Tastes

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Abstract. This paper provides an analysis of statements with predicates of personal taste (*tasty, fun*, etc.) Rather than directly relativizing semantic interpretation to a judge (cf., Lasershon, 2005), this paper aims to capture the phenomenon called 'faultless disagreement' (the fact that one can deny a speaker's subjective utterance without challenging the speaker's opinion) by means of pragmatic restrictions on quantification domains. Using vagueness models, a statement like *the cake is tasty* is analyzed as true in a partial context c iff it is true in the set of completions t consistent with c (Kamp, 1975), wherein *tasty* denotes different, contextually possible, taste measures (Kennedy, 1999). Phrases like *for me* restrict the set of completions to those with taste measures consistent with the speaker's taste. Faultless disagreement naturally follows assuming speakers accommodate or reject implicit restrictions of this sort (Lewis, 1979).

Keywords: Taste; faultless disagreement; vagueness; context restriction.

1 Disagreements over Taste

One can deny an utterance like *the cake is tasty* or *running is fun* without challenging the speaker's opinion. The speaker asserts 'φ', his addressee '¬φ', and still neither can be blamed for making a mistake. Lasersohn (2005); MacFarlane (2005), and Egan et al. (2005), among others, illustrate that such 'faultless disagreements' characterize, beside statements about taste, also aesthetic, moral and probability statements, future contingents, vagueness, and epistemic modals. These authors aim to account for faultless disagreements by relativizing semantic interpretation to a judge (or 'context of assessment'). On this 'relative truth' approach, contexts specify in addition to a speaker, a world and a time of evaluation, also a judge. Due to variance in the judge-world-time parameters, the truth values of statements with, e.g., taste predicates, may vary between contexts (cf., (1a)), although their content remains the same (1c).

(1) a. $[\![\text{The cake is tasty}]\!]_{c,i,a} = 1$ iff $[\![\text{The cake}]\!]_{c,i,a} \in [\![\text{tasty}]\!]_{c,i,a}$
(where c is a context, i a world-time pair and a the judge).

b. $[\![\text{The cake is tasty for Bill}]\!]_{c,i,a}=1$ iff $[\![\text{The cake is tasty}]\!]_{c,i,[\![\text{Bill}]\!]_{c,i,a}}$

c. $[\![\text{The cake is tasty}]\!]_c = 1$ iff $[\![\text{The cake is tasty}]\!]_c(W(c),A(c))$
(where W(c) and A(c) are the world-time pair and judge in c.)

In this setting, faultless disagreement arise due to shifts in the contextual parameters, usually triggered by speakers' tendency towards autocentric interpretations, e.g., while a speaker may truthfully assert *the cake is tasty* based on herself as a judge, her addressee may truthfully assert *the cake is not tasty*, with himself as the judge. Still, no cake is both *tasty* and *not tasty* in any single context.

Dominant opponents of this approach argue against it based on theoretical and empirical considerations (for a detailed discussion see von Fintel and Gilles, 2008a). Importantly, if semantics is subjective to the extent suggested by relative truth theories, then why do speakers ever bother to deny others' utterances at all?

On the other side of the spectrum, theories claim for standard, 'impersonal' interpretations for taste predicates (Nouwen, 2009; Wolf, 2009), such as those in (2).

(2) a. $[\![\text{The cake is tasty}]\!]_i = 1$ iff $[\![\text{the cake}]\!]_i \in [\![\text{tasty}]\!]_i$.
b. $[\![\text{Bill finds the cake tasty}]\!]_i = 1$ iff $[\![\text{the cake}]\!]_i \in [\![\text{tasty}]\!]_i$, for all indices i consistent with Bill's subjective experience.

Faultless disagreements are explained by virtue of the vagueness of taste predicates. We are inherently unable to reach full knowledge of the extension of expressions like *tasty*. Consequently, we can only base our claims on our own sensory experience (the gastronomic pleasure we feel while eating things), as well as on weak clues others give us about their experience. Thus, all edible things are *always* borderline of taste predicates (Nouwen, 2009).

Formally, vague predicates are often interpreted within contexts c, via a set of indices T_c, the worlds (Stalnaker 1978) or completions (van Fraassen, 1969; Kamp, 1975) consistent with the information in c (completions being 'classical' contexts, wherein every statement is either true or false). Truth of a statement S in c is defined based on these indices as follows (time indices are avoided, for simplicity sake):

(3) S is true in c iff S is true in every $t \in T_c$; S is false in c iff S is false in every $t \in T_c$, and S is undetermined in c, otherwise.

The 'impersonal', vagueness based theory considers every taste statement always undetermined in actual contexts c. This has a variety of consequences. First and foremost, even when no attitude report or *for/ to* PP is present, there is still the intuition that taste predicates express someone's taste (after all, the most trustworthy source of beliefs about taste comes from our private sensory experience). Second, there is nothing scalar about taste predicates, as everything forms a borderline case. The problem is that if personal tastes do not tell us anything about the impersonal interpretation of *tasty*, the theory about it is impossible to refute. And if personal tastes do show anything, then, the large-scale taste differences between people prove false the idea of a single impersonal interpretation.

2 A New Proposal

In this paper, focusing on predicates of personal taste, I argue that relativity does not enter the semantics, except through independently-motivated, pragmatic mechanisms. While the approach developed in this paper is eventually vagueness-based, it also differs from, e.g., Nouwen (2009), in important respects. Part 2 elaborates on its different components and how they bear on the personal and public aspects of taste predicates. Part 3 presents a variety of consequences. In addition, it grounds the discussion within a broader framework of linguistic analysis of different types of expressions with 'personal' ingredients.

2.1 The Personal Ingredient

First and foremost, this paper claims that there is no such thing as "one true answer" when it comes to taste. Do you, the readers, like salty French fries or sweet cream cakes, both or neither? Do you prefer Mozart to Bach, or the opposite? Let alone opera sopranos or rock stars. Different readers can definitely possess different tastes, and probably more often than not, they in fact do. Thus, a single unique interpretation of, e.g., *tasty* or *fun* need not necessarily exist in the actual world. In order to formally represent this idea, interpretation in contexts c can be modeled via the set T_c of completions t consistent with the information in c. These indices can be richer than worlds. For example, in Kamp (1975) completions determine cutoff points for vague adjectives, although the author holds that no such thing as a cutoff point exists in the actual world. On the present proposal, completions determine full fledged interpretations for, e.g., *tasty*. Each corresponds to the taste of one possible individual. Thus, different completions differ with respect to the interpretation of *tatsy*, while none corresponds to the actual 'objective' (inter-personal) interpretation (as such probably does not exist).

What is the basic interpretation of *tasty* in each completion t? Personal taste predicates P are typically gradable (cf., the felicity of *tastier, as tasty as, very / too /fairly tasty,* etc.), though the existence of different tastes imply different scales. Therefore, this paper associates taste predicates in each completion t with degree functions, f(P,t), i.e. mappings of entities to degrees (cf., Kennedy, 1999). Thus, *tasty* holds true of an object x in t iff the value f(tasty,t)(x) exceeds the cutoff point (standard of membership) of *tasty* in t, standard(tasty,t), as illustrated in (4). *Tastier* holds true of an object pair <x,y> in t iff the value f(tasty,t)(x) exceeds the value f(tasty,t)(y), as illustrated in (5).[1]

(4) $[\![\text{The cake is tasty}]\!]_c = 1$ iff for all $t \in T_c$, $[\![\text{the cake}]\!]_t \in [\![\text{tasty}]\!]_t$
Iff for all $t \in T_c$, f(tasty,t) ($[\![\text{the cake}]\!]_t$) > standard(tasty,t).

[1] Nothing hinges on this type of an analysis of gradability. If an analysis without degrees can be made to work out, then probably it can also be made compatible with the present proposal.

(5) $[\![\text{The cake is tastier than the ice cream}]\!]_c = 1$
Iff for all $t \in T_c$, $\langle [\![\text{the cake}]\!]_t, [\![\text{the ice cream}]\!]_t \rangle \in [\![\text{tastier}]\!]_t$
Iff for all $t \in T_c$, $f(\text{tasty},t)([\![\text{the cake}]\!]_t) > f(\text{tasty},t)([\![\text{the ice cream}]\!]_t)$

Modifiers and subordinators such as *for X*, *to X*, *in X's opinion*, *I find X P* or *I consider X P*, are, therefore, explicit means of subjectively restricting contexts. For example, *the cake is tasty for me* is true in c iff *the cake is tasty* is true in every completion t of c in which the values of f(tasty,t) and standard(tasty,t) are consistent with my own taste: Entities' values represent my opinion about their tastes, and so is the cutoff point between *tasty* and *not-tasty*.

(6) $[\![\text{The cake is tasty for Dan}]\!]_c = 1$ iff
For all $t \in T_{Dan} \subseteq T_c$, $f(\text{tasty},t)([\![\text{the cake}]\!]_t) > \text{standard}(\text{tasty},t)$.

As the information these constituents provide is presupposed, not asserted, it tends to be preserved under negation, e.g., *It is not tasty for Sam* doesn't normally mean it is tasty, but not for Sam.

2.2 The General (Public) Ingredient

Second, according to the present proposal, although tastes are personal, information about the interpretation of taste predicates *can* become publicly available.

Information about particular tastes can be gained through individual eating experiences, based on which generalizations on taste can be inferred. Thus, we can reasonably say that oil does not taste well, but chocolate does. Some people are less crazy than others about chocolate, but almost no one considers it disgusting. The opposite is the case with regard to oil. In fact, one's ability to draw generalizations about the taste of different groups of people plays an important role in one's social and cultural life. Conversations and disputes regarding utterances like, *the cake is tasty* are a main tool to this end. For example, it is publicly known that not everyone loves, say, avocado salads. Thus, before offering such a salad one is likely to consult with her partner about the matter. Similarly, before choosing a film to go to on a first date, one would usually try to find out whether her partner finds romantic comedies more *fun* than horror films, or vice versa, whether mainstream is fine, or independent cinema is preferred, and so on and so fourth. This is important because speakers order tastes in hierarchies. They argue for or against these orderings based on their cultural appropriateness or fitness to the spirit of the time and circumstances. Speakers do all that by uttering and disputing taste statements, thereby expressing or negotiating social dominance relations (thus, formally, completions are ordered by contextual relevance depending on how relevant and important the taste functions in them rank).

To recap, due to all that, if, for instance, one is to invite guests for dinner (including, say, one's bosses), one can fairly safely choose to serve pasta with a Bolognese sauce, rather than, say, an avocado with mint salad. But if some guests are vegetarian, then one may better go for a fungi cream sauce. And if some have

children, getting the simplest sort of Ketchup, or even leaving some Pasta with no sauce at all, is probably a very good idea (adults will not like it, though). Of course, these and many others descriptions of facts about tastes are non-perfect generalizations. They admit exceptions. This brings us to the next point.

2.3 Restricted Generalizations: Synthesis of the Personal and General

Third, quantification in natural languages is by default restricted. Consider, for example, the quantifying expression *everything* in (7a). The domain of the universal quantifier denoted by *everything* clearly does not include every possible object, only *sites in Paris,* or maybe even only famous or adored sites.

(7) I lived near the Seine, near Boulevard St. Germain and Rue St. Michel, near the market and the Pantheon, near everything (*Haaretz*, 04.01.2002).

Conventionally, contextual restrictions on quantifying expressions are represented by a context variable (say-, X_t), whose value is a set of relevant individuals (cf., von Fintel 1994). Accordingly, the truth conditions of a statement with a quantifying expression, like (8a), require that every individual, which is a duck and is in the set of relevant individuals will be in the denotation of *lays whitish eggs*.

(8) $\forall t \in T_c$: $[\![\text{A duck lays whitish eggs}]\!]_t = 1$ iff $\forall x \in ([\![\text{duck}]\!]_t \cap X_{\text{duck},t})$: $x \in [\![\text{lays whitish eggs}]\!]_t$ ($X_{\text{duck},t}$ being the set of relevant entities in t).[2]

We also find restrictions in theories of conditionals (Kratzer 1979, 1986; Kadmon and Landman 1993). The conditional in (9a) is restricted via $X_{\text{John subscribes to a newspaper}}$ to be only about subscriptions to a newspaper that John can read. (9b) is restricted to eventualities (or completions) in which there is no oil in the tea. This is crucial, for instance, to account for the fact that, intuitively, (9b) fails to entail (10).

(9) a. If John subscribes to a newspaper, he gets well informed.
b. If there is sugar in the tea, the tea tastes well.

(10) If there is sugar and oil in the tea, the tea tastes well.

Thus, grammar encompasses mechanisms of implicit domain restriction (Partee, 1989; Kratzer 1979, 1986; von Fintel 1994). They can be readily used also for our present purposes. Thus, we can say that some things (e.g., oil) are tasty according to no 'relevant' taster in a given context (restricting the tasters to be human, with a typical taste bud system, etc.) Other things (e.g., Pasta Bolognese) are tasty according to all tasters in a contextually given set (we do not always *have* to worry about, e.g.,

[2] Notice that in this formulation X_t is given in each word/ completion separately, which allows us to represent vagueness with regard to the set of 'relevant' individuals (cf., Sassoon, 2009).

children or vegetarian, anymore). Thus, in each index, *tasty* measures the extent of gastronomic pleasure an eating event causes a certain type of subject. The subject in question, though, is most often not specified, allowing hearers to take into account all the contextually plausible and relevant tastes. Disputes (or agreements) about taste make sense precisely because taste statements are general, rather than personal.

To be sure, denotations of predicates are often interpreted restrictively even in the absence of a quantifying expression. Consider, for example, utterances of negated predicates like *not a bird* or *non-birds* in a context of a zoo. Hearers hardly ever interpret these predicates as referring to the garbage cans or to the cages or fences; nor do they interpret them as referring to visitors in the zoo, though all these constitute members of the given denotations. Moreover, hearers do not normally assume that sentences like *Tweety is a bird* are about ostriches. Atypical birds are, by default, considered irrelevant.[3] Finally, context restrictions are certainly at play when statements with vague predicates such as *the line is long* are evaluated. We can assert such statements only when we contextually restrict the set of possible cutoff points.

For the purposes of this paper (representing faultless disagreements), I make do by representing implicit context restrictions in taste statements via accommodation of, e.g., an implicit *for* phrase or *find* subordinator's interpretation (Lewis, 1979), but for alternative proposals concerning the representation of implicit context restrictions see von Fintel (1994) and Stanley and Szabo (2000).

von Fintel and Gilles (2008) argue for a 'restricted quantification' analysis of faultless disagreement in statements with epistemic modality. Epistemic modals quantify over possibilities consistent with a relevant information state, where contexts of utterance decide whose information state that is. But given a context of utterance, there are multiple ways of drawing the boundaries of the group holding the relevant information. Thus, it is indeterminate just which set of possibilities is quantified over by bare epistemic modals.

Crucially, in von Fintel and Gilles (2008), the group whose knowledge is under discussion only enters into play indirectly (the set of possibilities forming the modal base is construed of worlds consistent with the information distributed over the group members). This analysis has an appealing advantage. Epistemic modals maintain the interpretation type other modals have (quantifiers over a modal base). For the very same reason, there is no a priori reason against taking the group of judges (the subjects whose taste is under discussion) to affect the truth conditions of taste statements only indirectly. The set of possibilities based on which a vague taste adjective is interpreted is construed based on the tastes of the group members. This analysis has an appealing advantage. Adjectives of personal taste maintain the interpretation type and characteristics of other vague adjectives. Let us, then, present the main consequences of such a proposal.[4]

[3] For other examples and implications, see Sassoon (2009) and references therein.

[4] von Fintel and Gilles (2008) develop also a pragmatic theory of usage of epistemic modals. The present paper provides a theoretical setup, based on which this theory can be tested against data about taste statements. The discussion in the next section is preliminary, but nonetheless suggests that doing so can indeed be fruitful.

3 The Consequences of Restricted Quantification over Tastes

First and foremost, the conjunction of two sentences such as those in (11a-b) is a contradiction *in the absence and only in the absence of an appropriate context restriction*. The contradictory interpretation illustrated in (12a-b) is that the cake is both above and below *tasty*'s standard in any completion t of c (i.e., according to any possible, conceivable, taste measure and cutoff point in c.)

(11) a. (Dan:) The cake is tasty .
b. (Sam:) No it's not.

(12) a. $\forall t \in T_c$, f(tasty,t)($[\![\text{The cake}]\!]_t$) > standard(tasty,t).
b. $\forall t \in T_c$, f(tasty,t)($[\![\text{The cake}]\!]t$) ≤ standard(tasty,t).

Second, context restriction (e.g., via accommodation) can turn the interpretation equivalent to that of sentences (13a-b) (Lewis, 1979). When discourse participants are cooperative, striving for a non-contradictory interpretation, they are likely to assume that context is thus restricted. The result is the non-contradictory interpretation in (14a-b).

(13) a. The cake is tasty (for Dan / in Dan's opinion).
b. No it's not (for Sam / in Sam's opinion).

(14) a. $\forall t \in T_c$, s.t. the values of f(tasty,t) and standard(tasty,t) represent Dan's taste in c, f(tasty,t)($[\![\text{The cake}]\!]_t$) > standard(tasty,t).
b. $\forall t \in T_c$, s.t. the values of f(tasty,t) and standard(tasty,t) represent Sam's taste in c, f(tasty,t)($[\![\text{The cake}]\!]_t$) ≤ standard(tasty,t).

If Dan and Sam's tastes are different, they are adequately represented by different taste functions and/or cutoff points, namely by two different, non-overlapping sets of indices ($T_{Dan} \subseteq T_c$ and $T_{Sam} \subseteq T_c$, but $T_{Dan} \cap T_{Sam} = \varnothing$), differing along the interpretation of *tasty*. Thus, it may well be the case that in every t in T_{Dan}, the cake's degree of taste exceeds the standard, but in no t in T_{Sam}, the cake's degree does so. Still, the speakers may well agree that the indices in both these sets are consistent with the common ground, i.e., the interpretation of *tasty* in each represents a legitimate taste in c.

At any rate, such a polite discussion, with two purely personal interpretations, is characteristic of first dates or highly official meetings with very important personalities. Let us consider Dan and Sam after some period of happy relationships. Now they are less busy being polite (rendering utterances of the partner true), and more busy getting to know one another. Now Sam is more likely to respond to utterances such as *this c.d. is fun* or *this salad is tasty* with something like *C'mmon, that's teenage music!* or *No way! How can an Avocado-mint salad be tasty?*

Luckily, given the present analysis there is a natural sense in which two speakers in a dialogue such as (11a-b) may disagree. In uttering (11b) a bit less apologetically (or more assertively) than in a first date, Sam may imply that she prefers evaluating the asserted statement relative to a different set of taste functions and/or cutoff points,

perhaps because she views them as superior (more plausible or relevant), and hence more appropriate in c (more likely to be considered part of T_c). What is more, despite our pluralism with regard to taste, we all agree that, say, soap doesn't taste. Not everything goes. Thus, Sam's non-use of an explicit restrictor (e.g., *for Sam*) may even convey that in c we all agree that the cake doesn't taste (let us represent this proposition as $\neg\varphi$), i.e., that (11b) (namely, $\forall t \in T_c$, $[\![\neg\varphi]\!]_t = 1$) is true, while (13a) (namely, $\forall t \in T_{\mathbf{Dan}}$, $[\![\varphi]\!]_t = 1$) is inappropriate, as $T_{Dan} \cap T_c = \varnothing$.

We have just illustrated a personal interpretation vs. public interpretation scenario. Alternatively, in a bad day, Sam may interpret Dan non-restrictively, as conveying (11a) (namely, $\forall t \in T_c$, $[\![\varphi]\!]_t = 1$), and reject that on the basis that c is more pluralistic. It is consistent with completions in which the cake isn't tasty. Sam can take her own taste to form evidence for that ($\exists t \in T_{\mathbf{Sam}} \subseteq T_c$, $[\![\neg\varphi]\!]_t = 1$). This is a public vs. personal scenario. It is not cooperative in that Sam's response does not render Dan's utterance true (cf., von Fintel and Gilles, 2008). Dan could have been taken to base his generalization on his personal experience alone, but he was taken to provide a more general conjecture.

Thus, disagreements are taken to be faultless in a context c iff different context restrictions (and hence different completion sets) are used, whose legitimacy both sides appreciate. This condition is not always met, in particular not in personal vs. public scenarios characteristic of 'academic' discourse about art, food, and the like. In disagreements between students and their professor or between a listener and an expert on a Radio program, the responders are taken to 'know more' about taste than the speakers, whose views might, therefore, be considered mistaken (if they are not assertive, their tastes might drop off the contextually reduced common grounds).

Conversely, the public vs. personal scenario is characteristic of, for instance, mothers trying to gently convince their children to eat healthy food. A mother may be in a position to assert a statement like *This cheese is very tasty* if, say, the children she knows find it tasty. She may assert the statement even if she herself does not find the cheese tasty, because adult tastes may simply be irrelevant.[5] If mother cannot really tell what her child's taste is like, she can only convey that $\forall t \in (\cup\{T_x : x \text{ is one of the other children mother knows}\}) \subseteq T_c$, $[\![\text{This cheese is tasty}]\!]_t = 1$. At the same time, mother may conjecture or ask about the interpretation based on (i) her child's taste, or (ii) her child's taste together with the taste of the other children she knows or additional children (von Fintel and Gilles, 2008). The child, who may well be convinced that a candy is tastier to eat, may answer *Yucky, this cheese is disgusting!* Being the speaker, a child, and one who is expected to eat the cheese, he can legitimately consider himself part of the group whose tastes are relevant. As such, his view about the cheese gives sufficient evidence against mother's conjectures. The child can confirm or deny the strongest proposition she may have issued, whose truth value he presumes to know (von Fintel and Gilles, 2008 and references therein). Confirming her own proposition (as in *#ok, it is tasty*$_{\textit{for every child you know}}$) is not informative enough, certainly if he considers the cheese disgusting. One appropriate

[5] In fact von Fintel and Gilles (2008) illustrate this with epistemic modals, e.g., following a blood test that may rule out the possibility that John has cancer, an utterance of *I don't know whether john might have cancer; I will ask the doctors* cannot mean "I don't know whether, in view of what I know, John might have cancer". The doctors' knowledge is at stake.

answer is then *No, this cheese is disgusting*, which can only be based on the child's own taste ($\forall t \in T_{me} \subseteq T_c$, $[\![\text{this cheese is disgusting}]\!]_t = 1$). This interpretation is strong in that it entails that the cheese is not merely in the gap of *tasty* in c, but rather is in the negative denotation (which entails the falsity of (i), i.e. of "it is tasty for me"). Another appropriate answer is *No, this cheese is not tasty*, based on the taste of a group containing him and perhaps all other possible children. This answer conveys that $\neg\forall t \in (\cup\{T_x : x \text{ is a child}\}) \subseteq T_c$, $[\![\text{This cheese is tasty}]\!]_t = 1$, which entails that (ii) ("it is tasty for every child you know plus me") is not true. Denial makes sense because an interpretation based on a larger set of tastes (than those based on which mother made her assertion) is there to deny (von Fintel and Gilles, 2008).

So far we have illustrated how disagreements on the application of taste predicates may arise due to inherent indeterminacy regarding the degree function they denote. This kind of disagreements is impossible if *tasty* in, say, (11), is substituted by a predicate such as *tall*. The latter's degree function is fixed across contexts, or at least determines a context invariant ordering between entities' (based on their heights). Still, Sam and Dan can disagree about the comparison class. Sam may assert that *Joe is tall* based on Joe being taller than her (i.e. based on indices in which Joe and her form the comparison class), and Dan may disagree saying *no, Joe is not tall!*, based on Joe's being shorter than him (indices in which Joe and him form the given class).

Furthermore, again, a *for* phrase can provide a restriction to indices with a given comparison class, as in *Mary is tall for her age/ school*. In addition, in, for instance, *these cookies are tasty for cats*, the *for* phrase operates as a restrictor both at the level of the comparison class *and* at the level of the taste functions in question. Moreover, *for* phrases can restrict epistemic modal bases (as in *for all that I know,…*) Finally, the same data can be found in other languages, like Hebrew and Italian.[6] Altogether, the data support an analysis of *for* phrases as temporarily restricting evaluation contexts.

To sum up, the present approach captures different types of personal ingredients of interpretation and their relation to the common ground. It provides unified means to account for a variety of ingredients that grammar collapses together through the use of *for* phrases (e.g., personal degree functions, comparison classes, and epistemic modal bases). No new grammatical mechanisms are introduced. Independently-motivated, pragmatic mechanisms (accommodation of context restrictions) suffice. While the availability of faultless disagreements supports a classification of taste predicates as vague or indeterminate, it does not support their classification as true relative to a judge (Lasersohn, 2005). Nor does their availability depend on the way a personal ingredient may be realized (as indices, implicit indexicals, or non-indexical parameters). Rather, it depends on the existence of indeterminacy. If it is possible to interpret an ingredient affecting the truth conditions as general, the very attempt to generalize invokes disputes. If it is possible to withdraw (restrict the domain of application of the generalization) disagreement becomes faultless.

[6] In Hebrew we find: *Bill gavoha le-gilo* ('Bill is tall for his age'); *Ha-uga teima le-Bill/ le-xatulim* ('The cake is tasty for Bill/ for cats') and *Le-or ha-yeda shely, …* ('For all that I know,...'). In Italian we find: *È grande per la sua età* ('(s/he) is big for his age'); *La torta e` gustosa per me / per (i) gatti* ('The cake is tasty for me /for (the) cats'); and *Per tutto ciò che so, …* ('For all that I know,...')

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