In 1561, following a failed attempt to eradicate Protestantism in Piedmont, the Duke of Savoy was forced to sign the Treaty of Cavour, granting the Waldensians the right to practise their religion, albeit only in a few well-defined valleys. Although the Savoy court tried to limit Waldensian freedom as much as possible, their subsequent spread beyond these boundaries in the following century did not lead to any serious repercussions. This uneasy tolerance ended in early 1655, when the Waldensians were ordered, under penalty of death, to convert within three days or withdraw into their valleys. Initially they complied, but when they saw their homes plundered and their fields destroyed, they returned to protect their homes. In April a force of Savoyard troops, strengthened with Irish mercenaries, was sent to punish them. But the Waldensians were now armed and recalcitrant, forcing the Savoyards to wait for reinforcements from passing French troops.²¹ In the ensuing battle, around 2,000 Waldensians (according to current estimates) died by violence, starvation, and frostbite.²² News of the Piedmont massacre was quickly picked up and spread by dozens of pamphlets and newsletters, shocking Protestant Europe and turning the Piedmont Easter Massacre into an international affair.²³ Protestant states rallied to the cause, organising diplomatic and financial aid. Samuel Morland, Oliver Cromwell’s secretary and envoy to Savoy, would later remark, with no little pride, that ‘there has never been such great unanimity in the cause of religion’.²⁴

On 19 May, news that around 4,000 Waldensians had been killed by French troops first reached the States-General. Noting that ‘although the churches in these quarters are not part of the Reformed church of France, they nonetheless share a great conformity and similarity with them’, the States instructed Willem Boreel, their ambassador at the French court, to verify the rumours and, if true, to intercede with the French king.²⁵ This comment implies that their action was motivated by the idea that the Waldensians were fellow believers. Eight days later, the Dutch ambassadors in England and France had not only confirmed the massacre, but also that it had been carried out by troops under Savoy command. The States then resolved to intercede with the duke.²⁶ Their intervention, the States-General wrote, was motivated by a sense of duty and a general Christian compassion, and moreover because the Republic ‘had an interest in the preservation of all those who profess the Reformed Religion’.²⁷ Furthermore, they firmly rejected the duke’s accusation that the Waldensians had disobeyed his orders to withdraw, and had therefore been punished for their rebellion rather than for their religious beliefs. On the contrary, the States argued, the Waldensians had always been loyal subjects. Their cruel persecution therefore violated previously granted rights and freedoms, and breached accepted moral values, especially ‘Christian gentleness and charity’.²⁸ Further diplomatic steps followed on 7 June, after the States-General received a letter from the Protestant Swiss Cantons. The French king (who denied having ordered his troops to participate in the attack) would be called upon to mediate, and in addition the States-General would write letters to Cromwell, Lord Protector of England, and the Geneva city council, inviting them to join forces with the Republic on behalf of the Waldensians. The next day an urgent request arrived from Cromwell, who, like the Republic, was also trying to mobilise the Protestant states.²⁹

On 28 July, the States-General unanimously approved a general collection, which, they explained in their letter announcing the collection to the provincial States, had been inspired by the ‘laudable and Christian example’ set by Cromwell, the Evangelical Swiss Cantons, and the French Reformed.³⁰ The Waldensians themselves did not call for the Republic’s support until the end of August.³¹ When they finally made their request, they denied the accusation of rebellion, instead asserting the cruelty and unlawfulness of the persecution as well as their great distress. In other words, they were innocent victims of tyranny. Moreover, they stressed that they adhered to the same Protestant faith as the Republic and invoked the shared memory of persecution. By referring to the ‘Catholic yoke’ under which the Republic had also suffered, they drew a parallel between their situation and the Dutch Revolt, placing their plight in the wider context of Protestant suffering.³² While Waldensian propagandists, in order not to jeopardise diplomatic efforts by Catholic France, only used confessionally neutral (that is, legal and humanitarian) arguments in the public media, they were clearly not averse to using confessional rhetoric in their direct communications with Protestant authorities.³³ Finally, they played on the status of the Republic: ‘All of Europe is waiting for what [your] Lordships will do in this matter, so have mercy on us.’³⁴ Although the letter arrived a month after the decision on the collection had been made, and therefore played no role in the decision-making process, the fact that the States-General had the letter printed in support of the collection implies that they accepted these arguments and considered them a suitable way of convincing donors.

The provinces had agreed on a joint, nationwide collection, which was to be conducted throughout the country on one and the same day. The Utrecht delegates had even proposed ‘a general collection without any exception of religion’.³⁵ However, according to Lieuwe van Aitzema, a generally well-informed regent and diplomat, Holland feared that there might be ‘bitterness or alienation’ between the different confessions if some did not contribute proportionately.³⁶ In his private diary he noted that it was feared that ministers would exaggerate the massacre ‘to the detriment of the papists’.³⁷ These fears were not unfounded, as shown by an incident in Leiden a few weeks before the decision on the collection was made. On 9 June, after a debate between a Reformed minister and a Catholic priest about the Piedmont massacre, a Catholic had wished Dutch Protestants the same beating as in Savoy, which led to fighting in the Leiden harbour between Catholics and Protestants.³⁸ That this incident occurred just then was no coincidence, as 9 June had been proclaimed a national prayer day in commemoration of the peace with England (1654), and ministers undoubtedly included the recent events in Piedmont in their sermons.³⁹ However, anti-Catholic agitation was not limited to Holland: holding up the 1641 Irish Rebellion and the Piedmont massacre as warnings of what might also happen in the Dutch Republic, the Utrecht Reformed synod demanded a harsh crackdown on Catholics.⁴⁰

In the end, the States-General decided to leave the actual execution of the collection, the so-called voet ende forme (‘base and form’), to the provinces themselves.⁴¹ Most provinces opted for collections within the Reformed churches. Only the States of Groningen decreed a door-to-door collection without exceptions (fig. 2), while Holland left the decision to the cities.⁴² In some places Lutheran, Remonstrant, and Mennonite churches also contributed.⁴³ The proceeds of the collections were to be transferred to the provincial States, and in the case of the Generality Lands to the States-General. From there, the money was forwarded to the Geneva city council, to which the distribution was entrusted (tab. 1).⁴⁴ Both in 1643 and 1655, the final decision on the form of the collection was decentralised, but for very different reasons: in 1643 it was to uphold the national foreign policy of neutrality during the English Civil War and to protect trade interests; in 1655 to prevent domestic religious disturbances.⁴⁵ Another important difference was that the Irish collection was in fact a series of local collections that took about two years to complete, whereas the Waldensian collection was decided at a national level jointly by all seven provinces. Although decisions about collections in the Dutch Republic lay formally with the city councils, the Waldensian collection shows that the consent of the provincial States made it unnecessary to ask every city council for permission, although each city still published its own collection order.

What inspired the authorities in 1655 to organise a nationwide relief effort for the first time in Dutch history? Fortunately, in their proposal to the provinces the States-General explained their motives, which, with a few minor adjustments, were incorporated into the Groningen collection order mentioned above.⁴⁶ In it, they emphasised that the Waldensians ‘professed the Reformed religion which they refuse to forsake’, thus underlining the religious character of the persecution.⁴⁷ Legal arguments such as those put forward in the public media by the Waldensians themselves were limited to a brief mention of Savoyard promises that had been violated. The letter denounced the barbaric atrocities and made explicit reference to the fate of the women and children, who had sought refuge in the high mountains, where they were now suffering from hunger and cold, but they were not directly referred to as fellow believers. The States-General expressed their humanitarian concerns even more explicitly by qualifying the massacre as an example of ‘gruesome, inhuman, and more than barbaric cruelty’.⁴⁸ Moreover, both the States of Groningen and the city of Amsterdam referred to inhuman cruelty in their own collection orders.⁴⁹ When the States-General intervened again in 1663, they criticised the duke for renouncing not only ‘the first principles of Christianity, which are charity and justice’, but also ‘humanity’ itself.⁵⁰ Clearly, there was already an awareness among regents that certain types of state behaviour were contrary to a humane policy. However, it seems that they more readily used humanitarian considerations to justify a relief effort to the general public or to persuade persecuting authorities to moderate their actions than as a ground for supporting foreign fellow believers.⁵¹ In their internal deliberations confessional solidarity prevailed, while their efforts to unite Protestant Europe show that confessional politics also provided an important incentive.

Nevertheless, confessional affiliation alone was not enough to secure support, as illustrated by the reaction of the Amsterdam city council to the peace treaty concluded between the Duke of Savoy and the Waldensians. News that the Waldensians had signed the ‘Patent of Grace and Pardon’, an act by which they appeared to admit being rebels, reached the Dutch Republic on 26 September 1655.⁵² This prompted the Amsterdam city council to withhold any money until their innocence had been established, ‘as it has never been the intention of this State, nor of the private citizens, who have given so generously, to provide any subsidy’ or to grant ‘adverse mercy’ to people who ‘suffered not for their faith, but were castigated by their sovereign for their disobedience’.⁵³ In the 1660s, when the persecution briefly resumed, rumours spread by the Savoy court questioning the innocence of the Waldensians, and accusing their leaders of misusing the collection money of 1655, successfully undermined new initiatives for a nationwide relief campaign.⁵⁴ These incidents demonstrate that transnational solidarity was not only based on a shared confession, but that the donors also had to believe the recipients were trustworthy and innocent. Confessional affiliation was a condition of receiving aid, but not a guarantee.

At first glance, it seems that the Dutch Republic had nothing to gain from its efforts to help the Waldensians. Although the authorities considered the massacre of the Waldensians to be barbaric and inhumane, their decision to support the survivors was primarily religious in motivation. Yet the States-General themselves gave an additional reason in their declaration that they were following Cromwell’s example. However, this explanation seems difficult to believe, given that diplomatic steps had already been taken before Cromwell’s letter arrived, and also because of the widely felt animosity in the Dutch Republic towards the Protector following the regicide of King Charles i (1649), which was exacerbated by the lost Anglo-Dutch war (1652-1654). This conflict between two Protestant states did not fit into the early modern framework of interpreting wars in terms of religious conflict, or as a struggle against a monarchical tyrant. To explain it, the Dutch developed, according to Helmer Helmers, a new ‘demonic’ interpretation, in which the war was understood as a struggle against demonic regicides and Cromwell was seen as the incarnation of the devil who had instigated the war.⁵⁵ Although this devilish image of Cromwell became somewhat contested after the war, it continued to be an important theme in the public media, poetry, and plays even after the peace with England.⁵⁶ To see the States-General’s relief effort merely as a simple imitation of an example set by Cromwell therefore seems flawed. Of course, by saying this, the States pledged their allegiance to the Protestant cause. There might, however, be another interpretation, one which takes into account both the poor relations with the English state and the domestic situation in the Dutch Republic. In 1655, the domestic polemic surrounding the Treaty of Münster (1648) was far from over.⁵⁷ Although some had welcomed peace, others feared it would damage the unity of the Republic, endanger the public church, and put the state at risk. This feeling of impending doom was aptly expressed by the anonymous author of the pamphlet Na-wêen vande Vrede (Aftermath of Peace, 1650):

The sentiment that the peace with Spain undermined the international reputation and status of the Dutch Republic was undoubtedly strengthened by the unsuccessful war with England and the turmoil that followed the 1654 Westminster peace treaty.⁵⁹ As we have seen, even the Waldensian request openly played on this sentiment. It seems plausible that the efforts on behalf of the Waldensians were not only confessional but also intended to reassert the Republic’s status as a major Protestant power to both domestic and international audiences, while at the same time calming domestic unrest. Perhaps, rather than following Cromwell’s example, the States competed with it. While mediation was motivated by confessional solidarity, the collection was at least partly justified by secular reasons.

Following the restoration of the Treaty of Cavour in 1664, there were no major persecutions in Piedmont until 1686. In neighbouring France however, persecutions increased from the 1660s onwards until the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in October 1685 banned Protestant worship. Many Huguenot refugees sought protection in Piedmont. Concerned about the large numbers of Protestants just outside his borders, Louis xiv forced his nephew, the Duke of Savoy, to follow suit. In January 1686 the duke issued an edict banning Protestant worship and ordering the expulsion of ministers and schoolmasters, effectively revoking the Treaty of Cavour.⁶⁰ Those Waldensians who resisted or refused to convert were imprisoned. Following prolonged mediation by the Protestant Swiss Cantons, the survivors were allowed to leave Piedmont on condition that they were not to be resettled close to the Savoy border. The Swiss were thus forced to find Protestant states that were prepared to take the refugees in.⁶¹ The first request to this effect reached the Dutch Republic in November 1686.⁶² It was assigned to the delegates for foreign affairs, who advised that the reply ought to be that the States-General were ‘moved with true compassion and will gladly show them, for as many as may come in this country, all works of love’.⁶³ However, the delegates from Holland first wanted to consult their principals, the States of Holland. After this consultation, the final answer was considerably less hospitable: the States-General were ‘not unwilling’ to take in ‘some’ Waldensians, but were ‘very apprehensive that they would not be able to subsist’ in the Dutch Republic due to the differences in language, climate, and in particular the nature of the country.⁶⁴ Therefore, the States-General judged that the Waldensians

When in 1688 another group of about a thousand Waldensians requested admission to the Dutch Republic or its overseas colonies, the States-General were only prepared to admit eight hundred of them to the Dutch Cape Colony in South Africa. They did, however, agree to provide 40,000 guilders from the collection for their transport and first necessities.⁶⁶

This reluctance to admit fairly small groups of Waldensians contrasted sharply with the rather more generous manner in which large groups of Huguenots were received over the same period.⁶⁷ According to Geert Janssen, by the middle of the seventeenth century the Dutch had developed a positive attitude towards migration. They had come to see their country as a ‘republic of refugees’, where immigrants were welcomed not only on the basis of the usual charitable arguments, but also on the basis of rational economic thinking.⁶⁸ But this hospitality apparently did not apply to the Waldensians. This is puzzling, because both groups were Reformed Protestants, religious refugees, and French-speaking. The first and most obvious difference between the two groups, however, is that the Huguenots were expected to be skilled craftsmen, merchants, and intellectuals, while the Waldensians were seen as poor mountain peasants from the very beginning. Second, the Huguenots had a strong Dutch support base in the French-speaking Walloon churches, and their plight was widely discussed in the public press. With all the attention paid to the Huguenots, the misery of the Waldensians was only sporadically mentioned in the media and in the Walloon and Reformed churches.⁶⁹ More pertinent perhaps was the realisation that many of the French refugees who arrived after 1685 were in fact penniless and in urgent need of financial support.⁷⁰ The need to protect the already overburdened public poor relief system undoubtedly made the authorities reluctant to admit more destitute refugees. Just as economic considerations led magistrates to seek to attract Huguenots by offering them citizenship, economic privileges, and generous loans, so they led to the States-General denying the Waldensians entry.⁷¹

In May 1687, the Protestant Swiss cantons petitioned the Dutch Republic for a general collection for the Piedmontese refugees. By June, Holland had already consented, but it would take until October for the last province to agree, probably because by then it was certain that Brandenburg was prepared to take them in. This time, all seven provinces agreed on a general door-to-door collection for the subsistence of the destitute Waldensians, to be held nationwide on 10 November.⁷² The organisation of the 1687 collection differed from that of 1655 in three important respects (tab. 1). First, the collection was carried out in a uniform manner throughout the country. Second, it was a door-to-door collection, which meant that everyone, including Catholics, would be confronted with collectors. In Utrecht, the province with the highest percentage of Catholics (fifty-five percent), measures were taken to ensure that Catholics would contribute proportionally.⁷³ To monitor this, a list had to be kept of what each Catholic person or household contributed to the collection (fig. 3).⁷⁴ In previous years, a number of cities and provinces had already monitored Catholic contributions to local and provincial collections for Huguenot immigrants.⁷⁵ While this could be explained by an increase in anti-Catholic sentiment in the Dutch Republic after the Revocation, there were also secular reasons for forcing Catholics to contribute.⁷⁶ As Reformed immigrants, the Huguenots had to be supported by public charities, which were typically funded by collections among all city residents.⁷⁷ Contributing to these collections could therefore be seen as a civic duty. Two anonymous pamphlets that discussed the alleged lack of Catholic support for these collections confirm this.⁷⁸ The author of Beweegreden en propositie tot soelaas der arme Franse vluchtelingen (Motive and Proposition for the Relief of the Poor French Refugees) suggested taxing Catholics if they failed to contribute sufficiently to the collections. This proposal was further discussed in the fictional Dialogue sur les imposts de Hollande (Dialogue about the Taxes in Holland) between passengers of a towing barge. One of the main characters, a lawyer from the Supreme Court of Holland, who probably represents the position of the States of Holland, argues ‘that the Huguenot refugees have become our fellow citizens’. He points out that the state is burdened with their upkeep and has therefore the right to force all inhabitants, regardless of their religion, to contribute to their upkeep.⁷⁹ Although these are just two pamphlets, they show that supporting Protestant immigrants was considered a civic duty and proof of civil allegiance. The 1687 Waldensian collection, on the other hand, was not intended to support immigrants or sustain the public poor relief system, but to help Protestants in faraway lands, who, in the eyes of many Dutch Catholics, had rebelled against their rightful sovereign. Nevertheless, the decision to collect door-to-door shows that the authorities considered such contributions a civic duty of all Dutch people, irrespective of their religious denomination. Finally, the collection of 1687 differed significantly from its predecessors in the handling of the collection money. Rather than simply being sent abroad, the fruits of the 1687 collection were pooled and deposited with Cornelis de Jonge van Ellemeet, the receiver-general of the Dutch Republic. This enabled the States-General to retain control over the money and use it as they saw fit. All in all, we can call the 1687 collection a ‘national’ campaign by virtue of it being more centralised, uniform, and covering the entire population.

The internal deliberations of the States-General were mainly concerned with the resettlement of those refugees who had left their fatherland because of their ‘staunch commitment to the Reformed Religion’ and were now living in miserable conditions in the Protestant Swiss cantons.⁸⁰ Most collection orders concentrated on the practical side of the collection, citing the ‘solace’ of the Waldensians as its aim.⁸¹ None of the resolutions or collection orders mentioned religious considerations, such as the defence of the true Protestant faith or confessional solidarity. The main focus was the refugee problem. There was commiseration with ‘these wretched people’, but no humanitarian arguments.⁸² The rather neutral tone of the collection orders was probably intended to avoid fuelling any further increase in religious tensions, but also served the national character of the collection which required that it engaged non-Protestant donors.

While the collection plainly served as a way of preventing a rush of unwanted immigrants into the Dutch Republic and the consequential overburdening of the poor relief system, its national character and the fact that the proceeds were placed under the direct control of the States-General point strongly to a link with foreign policy. Although the Peace of Nijmegen (1678-1679) had ended the war between France and the Dutch Republic, few believed it would halt Louis xiv’s territorial ambitions. The French invasion of the Southern Netherlands in 1683 had already alarmed the Dutch, while the increasingly repressive treatment of the Huguenots further strained international relations. Fears of a repetition of 1672 began to resurface following the Catholic succession to the English throne in February 1685, fears which were amplified when France imposed restrictions on Dutch trade in August 1687.⁸³ With the rising of international tensions, it seems plausible that the States-General’s decision in October to hold the collection was influenced by the prospect of a new war with France, in which the proceeds of the collection could come in handy.

One way to verify this hypothesis is to examine the use of the proceeds, since this indicates how the States interpreted the purpose of the collection. According to Ellemeet’s records, most of the money seems to have gone to the Waldensian refugees in Switzerland and various German states, which was in line with the formal collection objective.⁸⁴ However, after the outbreak of war with France in 1689 the money was also spent on supporting those Waldensians who had already returned to Switzerland in the run-up to the so-called Glorieuse Rentrée (Glorious Return), the armed invasion of Piedmont by the Waldensians (and Huguenots) in August 1689.⁸⁵ Gabriel de Convenant, the Dutch special envoy for Waldensian affairs in Switzerland, lent his support to these plans at the end of 1688. In a letter to the States-General, he noted that a return of the Waldensians to Piedmont could fit well into a broader anti-French policy, as they were capable of making ‘a great diversion’, especially since French refugees were eager to join them.⁸⁶ However, for this to succeed, he considered it crucial that the States give their consent and provide the funds to buy weapons and everything else necessary for this return.⁸⁷ The States-General adopted Convenant’s position at the beginning of 1689.⁸⁸ Not long thereafter, on 9 March, the Dutch declared war on France in order ‘to help avoid losing their religion and freedom’.⁸⁹ Attempts to move the war into Louis’s backyard were an integral part of Stadtholder-King William iii’s strategy. Piedmont was geographically ideally situated for an invasion of France which, it was hoped, would spark a Protestant revolt.⁹⁰ Subsidising the Glorious Return with funds from the 1687 collection was part of this policy.⁹¹ For the Dutch authorities, putting the collection money to martial use seems to have been considered in keeping with the purpose of the collection, or at the very least it was not seen as being in conflict with it. There is indeed something to be said for this reasoning, since a successful return of the Waldensians to their own valleys was perhaps the best way to achieve the collection’s objective of providing comfort and support, while at the same time protecting the Dutch Republic and the Protestant religion, which were the official grounds for the declaration of war in the first place.

The unexpected success of the Glorious Return not only increased Savoy’s strategic importance, it also transformed the status of the Waldensians. No longer were they merely destitute refugees, as they now became an important part of the Dutch foreign strategy. Recognising the danger, Louis xiv demanded that the Duke of Savoy take vigorous action against the Protestants on France’s border and threatened to send troops if he did not. In May 1690, however, Victor Amadeus chose to join the Grand Alliance against France. In exchange for financial and military support, the duke promised both to restore the privileges of his Waldensian subjects and to (temporarily) accept other Protestant refugees. It was not until May 1694 that the duke, under pressure from England and the Republic, formalised the annulment of the 1686 persecution edict. Once more the Waldensians were allowed to worship, albeit within strictly defined territorial limits.⁹² Nonetheless, these international agreements prevented further persecution of the Piedmontese Waldensians until 1731.

Savoy’s entry into the Grand Alliance in 1690 had led to an influx of Piedmontese and foreign Protestants into Piedmont, much to the chagrin of both Victor Amadeus and Louis xiv.⁹³ In 1696, when the duke and the king concluded a bilateral peace treaty, they secretly agreed that all French Protestants, who had been excluded from the Toleration Act of 1694, would be exiled. Unaware of this clause, the allies included the treaty in the Treaty of Rijswijk (1697), which ended the Nine Years’ War. In July 1698, about three thousand French Protestants, both Huguenots and Waldensians, were thus expelled from Savoy.⁹⁴ Two months later, the States-General discussed a request from the Protestant Swiss cantons which, overwhelmed with more than ten thousand refugees on their territories, asked the Republic to mediate in finding places for all these refugees to settle and to provide financial support.⁹⁵ On 5 November, the States-General appointed Pieter Valkenier as their special envoy for the relocation of the refugees.⁹⁶ Aware that this would require a huge amount of money, the States-General promptly proposed another collection in the hope that their financial support would persuade the Swiss cantons to let most of the refugees stay and other Protestant princes – Lutherans included – to take in the remaining refugees. As such, they wanted to set a good example and encourage other ‘Reformed princes and potentates’ to take similar measures. In addition, the States-General increased the Republic’s war budget by 60,000 guilders per annum in order to provide for the maintenance of French soldiers who had served in Piedmont and at the Rhine.⁹⁷ When Zeeland finally gave its consent on 7 February 1699, the States-General immediately ordered a general prayer day to be held on 25 February, followed by a nationwide door-to-door collection ‘without exception’ on the following day.⁹⁸ The proceeds were intended for ‘religious refugees from France, Piedmont, and the Palatinate, as well as for the preservation of the church in these parts and the continuation of the true Reformed religion’.⁹⁹ Interestingly, not one of the resolutions mentioned the possibility of admitting Waldensians to the Dutch Republic, but no reason was given. However, it is reasonable to assume that the States-General sought to avoid being burdened with the costs of long-term assistance to needy immigrants. Given the poor financial situation of the Dutch Republic after the Nine Years’ War, financing their resettlement elsewhere with the proceeds of a new collection was a much safer option.¹⁰⁰

Why was it, therefore, that while the Dutch Republic chose not to admit any refugees, it still supported the Waldensians and Huguenots after they lost their political significance in 1697? The resolutions show that preventing immigration and upholding the true faith were important motives. However, there is good reason to suspect that the States-General also intended to use the proceeds of the collection for other purposes when they settled upon calling it in early November 1698. Because the Peace of Rijswijk had failed to settle the Spanish succession, it was widely expected that peace would be short-lived, as the States’ decision to keep the French soldiers on their payroll already indicated. The General Petition of November 1698 also demonstrates that a new war was expected when the decision on the next collection was made. These annual petitions provided a political reflection on the war budget for the following year and were intended to convince the provinces of the necessity of the military efforts projected, and of the costs involved. In 1698, the Petition opened by noting that ‘it was to be wished that the affairs of the world had taken such a happy turn with the conclusion of the general peace, that complete peace and security had followed all the worries of war’. As the financial condition of the Republic precluded any increase in military spending that the likelihood of further conflict demanded, the Petition proposed that the budget remain unchanged.¹⁰¹ Apparently, the States-General foresaw a new war which would cause a financial shortfall, that might be in part alleviated by the proceeds of the new collection. The prospect of conflict may also have provided a further incentive for refusing to allow the Waldensians to take refuge in the Republic, since in the event that plans for an invasion of France were revived, the Waldensians could be deployed more quickly if they remained in the vicinity of Piedmont.

Does the actual use of the collection money confirm these assumptions? A large proportion of the money was indeed spent on the (resettlement of) refugees, the stated goal of the collection, but it is hard to determine exactly how much.¹⁰² There is no doubt, however, that a good deal of money was invested in plans to attack France from within. Such plans had already been part of the allied strategy in the 1690s, and were revived at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), when the Protestant Camisards in the Cevennes – who had seen their hope for religious freedom crushed in 1697 – took up arms in what became known as the Camisard War (1702-1710). The news of the uprising first reached Protestant Europe in the winter of 1702-1703.¹⁰³ In October 1703 Savoy re-joined the (revived) Grand Alliance, which, combined with the prospect of local support in France, made an invasion a real option.¹⁰⁴ Suggestions that a separate collection might be organised in support of the Camisard revolt and, by extension, to help finance an invasion of France from Piedmont, were being made in the circles that surrounded the influential Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius, who had also been closely involved in the invasion plans of the 1690s.¹⁰⁵ The States-General decided instead to use part of the 1699 collection for this purpose, probably to avoid the publicity a new collection would entail, as military plans usually thrive on secrecy. On 23 February 1704, Holland agreed to the States-General’s proposal to use 100,000 guilders from the 1699 collection for military support to the Camisards.¹⁰⁶ Two years later, funds had to be found again for the establishment of a battalion, if possible from the remainder of the 1699 collection.¹⁰⁷ Funds for the Camisards were also made available from the provincial contributions to the general war budget.¹⁰⁸ However, poor organisation probably prevented this aid from ever reaching the Camisards.¹⁰⁹ A secret resolution passed by the States-General in 1705 nonetheless noted that ‘a good sum from the general collection had already been spent for that purpose’. According to this resolution, supporting the Camisard revolt not only served a religious goal (‘for the sake of religion’), but also a secular military-political purpose, namely to ‘divert […] the arms of the enemy’ and bring ‘the war into the bosom of France’.¹¹⁰ The general wording of the collection objective, which referred to giving aid to ‘all kinds’ of (Reformed) refugees and the preservation of the Reformed religion, allowed for this broad interpretation.¹¹¹

Although the States-General were aware of the deplorable conditions of the refugees in Switzerland, they did not consider welcoming them to the Dutch Republic. Clearly, an important aspect of the 1699 collection was to prevent unwanted immigration by finding alternative resettlement sites for the refugees. In addition to these secular domestic considerations, the decision to hold the collection was influenced by the prospect of a new war to safeguard the national interests, which obviously included the preservation of the true Reformed religion. This goal, and the desire of the States-General to inspire other Reformed rulers, demonstrates that at the end of the seventeenth century confessional politics still played an important role in the support of foreign fellow believers.

In June 1730, Savoy issued a new edict which amounted to a very strict interpretation of the 1694 Toleration Edict, causing about 1,700 Protestants to leave. Protestants from the Pragelato valley, ceded by France to Savoy at the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, were ordered to convert or go into exile, as the duke argued they were not protected by the 1694 edict. Waldensians who had converted to Catholicism during the persecutions of the 1680s but had returned to their Protestant faith after 1694 were considered lapsed heretics, a crime punishable by death. They were given six months to either convert again or leave. Toleration remained in force only for those Waldensians who had always stayed with their ancestral faith. The States-General appealed to the duke to reconsider the edict, stating the new measures were a violation of the treaties of 1690 and 1694.¹¹² These legal arguments were not accompanied by any explicit humanitarian arguments, although the States-General did show some compassion when they stated that it ‘pained them’ to learn that ‘these poor people’ were forced to choose between their fatherland and their conscience.¹¹³

In January 1731, the Swiss cantons approached the Dutch Republic for diplomatic mediation, admission of Waldensians, and financial support. The States-General were prepared to mediate, and just as in 1688 they looked into the possibility of admitting Waldensians to the Dutch overseas colonies.¹¹⁴ After two more urgent Swiss letters, the States of Holland, which had been pushing for collections in all provinces from the first letter onwards, decided in July 1731 to resort to a provincial door-to-door collection, which had to be done soon so the proceeds could be used before the onset of winter. Their decision rested on religious arguments, such as ‘Christian duty’ and the ‘honour’ of the Reformed Religion. Although the States moved in haste to pre-empt the winter, they did not explicitly mention humanitarian considerations, such as the refugee problem or the dire need of the exiles.¹¹⁵ The collection order stated only that the collection was ‘for the benefit of the Piedmontese Waldensians who had to leave their fatherland for the sake of religion’.¹¹⁶ Public justification thus closely matched the States’ internal motivation. In the States-General, Holland again proposed that each province should organise ‘an equal Christian charity’.¹¹⁷ However, the other provinces preferred to centralise the money the collection would raise, fearing a lot of confusion if each of them would decide for itself how to spend their proceeds. The States-General therefore suggested following the method of the (national) collections of 1687 and 1699 and explicitly called on Holland to refrain from a provincial collection.¹¹⁸ Holland would not give in, and continued with its provincial collection.¹¹⁹ The debate surrounding the general collection would continue in the States-General until at least 1733, during which time it was gradually expanded to include more groups, such as expelled Salzburg Lutherans and captured sailors. However, nothing came of it, and no collections were held in the other provinces.¹²⁰

Again, immigration proved to be a major issue. Even when in 1732 the number of aspiring immigrants had dropped to a mere six hundred, the States of Holland still proved unwilling to take in Waldensian refugees, because among them were ‘several old and impotent men, as well as women and small children.’ Instead, they decided to pay the Swiss cantons a further fifty thousand guilders from the collection proceeds and admit only those individuals who could support themselves, but without their families.¹²¹ Despite another refusal by the States of Holland to accept Waldensians in September 1733, the canton of Bern sent three ships with refugees down the Rhine to Rotterdam. Their unexpected arrival in October forced Holland to admit about four hundred Waldensians of all ages and professions. The immigrants were not allowed to settle freely like the Huguenots before, but were divided over cities with Walloon Churches, which were given money from the collection to support them.¹²²

Whereas Holland was trying to prevent the immigration of Waldensians, three Zeeland cities – Middelburg, Vlissingen, and Veere (in 1732) – and the Generality Land Vrije van Sluis (in 1733) were actively recruiting expelled Salzburg Lutherans to make up for labour shortages. Both the States of Zeeland and the States-General gave permission for recruiting Salzburgers.¹²³ They did not provide any funds, however, which indicates that they considered these immigrants a local responsibility.¹²⁴ In 1732, seeking to persuade both the States of Zeeland and local authorities to allow the settlement of Prussian Mennonites, the Middelburg Mennonite congregation demanded that the Dutch Mennonite Committee for Foreign Needs (Verenigde Commissie voor Buitenlandsche Nooden) would guarantee to bear the costs should the immigrants or their descendants fall into poverty.¹²⁵ That same year, the Wageningen city council demanded similar guarantees to prevent any financial burdens for the magistrate, church, or guilds.¹²⁶ Apparently, the authorities had fewer problems with the immigration and settlement of Mennonites if they were supported by their own community. It is evident that the protection of the public poor relief system, which was ultimately the responsibility of the authorities, was an important incentive behind the refusal to admit certain groups of Reformed immigrants.

By 1731, the Waldensians were no longer politically important and supporting them would not result in any strategic or geopolitical advantage. Why, then, was the Republic willing to offer them diplomatic and financial support? On the one hand out of Christian compassion, as both Holland and the States-General stated, and on the other, as the States-General noted in a letter to the Duke of Savoy, because the Republic had been closely involved in the 1690 treaty which led to the Edict of Tolerance of 1694.¹²⁷ Despite several calls to this effect in the States-General, the provincial States failed to cooperate on a national basis because of their disagreement on how the collection proceeds ought to be managed. Why did Holland so strongly oppose the nationalisation of collection revenues in 1731, when it had not been a problem in 1687 and 1699? It is likely that Holland wished to take control over its own collection because it expected that the majority of the immigrants would settle within its borders. Or perhaps the province, which usually contributed more than sixty percent to these collections, feared that any unspent proceeds would fall into the hands of the States-General, especially given the problematic financial situation of the Dutch Republic, and of Holland in particular.¹²⁸ But more fundamentally, supporting Reformed immigrants was a form of poor relief, which was primarily a local and sometimes a provincial responsibility, but never a national one. This also explains why Holland had kept insisting on provincial collections. Although Holland’s solo action can be seen as an example of provincial particularism, it seems rather to be rooted in notions of (provincial) sovereignty and responsibility.

According to the States-General in 1655, the driving forces behind their engagement with foreign religious brethren were duty, Christian compassion, and Protestant interest, just as in 1731 the States of Holland claimed to act out of Christian duty and the honour of the Reformed religion. There is no doubt, then, that religion remained an important reason for supporting foreign Protestant minorities well into the eighteenth century. However, a common confessional identity alone was not enough to persuade the authorities to provide relief. While by 1655 the States-General had an idea that certain types of state behaviour were incompatible with a humane policy, their use of humanitarian language was generally confined to diplomatic mediations and to the justification of foreign aid to Dutch donors, and was not cited as a ground to support fellow believers. Decisions regarding foreign aid were thus based primarily on political interests, both domestic and foreign.

Foreign policy considerations varied from case to case, but their common denominator was the defence of the Dutch Republic (its territory, religious set-up, and international status) and the Reformed religion. The latter argument was not just religious in nature but also political, as it was closely linked to national security. In 1687 and 1699, national security concerns were particularly high, and were thus invoked to turn contributing to the collections into a patriotic duty. This justified nationwide door-to-door collections including all inhabitants, irrespective of their religious affiliation. The aims of the States-General, namely the preservation of both the state and the Reformed religion, were inextricably intertwined, a fact which explains the use of the collection proceeds for (anti-French) war purposes. It also suggests that upholding national foreign policy was an important, albeit often unspoken, purpose of these collections. That these objectives were real can be seen in the use to which the proceeds of the collection(s) were put.

A constant domestic concern after 1687 was the protection of the public poor relief system, which amounted to preventing unwanted immigration by using collections to pay for the resettlement of refugees elsewhere. Although early modern states were not able to prevent immigrants from entering their country, the Dutch Republic was able to take – and did take – measures at both state and provincial level in order to prevent mass immigration of (perceived) underprivileged migrants. This policy seems to be at odds with the reputation of the Dutch Republic as a safe haven for refugees. Was the realisation that many Huguenot immigrants had to rely on the public poor relief system perhaps a turning point in the Dutch attitude towards immigration? To answer this question, we need to go back to the Palatinate refugee crisis of the Thirty Years’ War. In 1628, the synod of South Holland wanted to establish a central fund for expelled German ministers, which was to be filled by means of a provincial collection. Moreover, it wanted to encourage other synods to set up similar funds in order to share the financial burden equally.¹²⁹ Afraid that such a fund would only attract ‘a crowd’ of needy immigrants ‘whom these lands cannot support’, the States of Holland prohibited both the collection and the establishment of the fund.¹³⁰ Between 1626 and 1641, the synod would see all its requests for provincial collections rejected for the same reason.¹³¹ However, as it was felt that they would be less attractive to these immigrants, small, local collections were allowed. This shows first of all that even before 1648, decisions on foreign aid were not made purely on religious grounds, but also included secular concerns. Furthermore, it reveals that the prevention of unwanted immigration in 1687 was not a direct result of the mass migration of Huguenots, nor of a more secular post-Westphalian policy, but rather of a concern for the public poor relief system and the economy. The generous reception of the Huguenots seems to have been the exception rather than the rule. Paradoxically, the admission of disadvantaged Reformed immigrants presented a larger problem than the admission of other Protestant denominations. However, the protection of the public poor relief system is a form of good governance – and an ongoing concern for the higher Dutch authorities, despite the fact that it was primarily a local responsibility in the decentralised Republic.

This article has approached large-scale transnational aid to foreign Protestants from the perspective of the higher civil authorities. The States-General and the provincial States played an important role in organising foreign aid when the national interests were at stake. When this was not the case, generating solidarity was left to the churches, for instance in 1728, when a flood disaster hit the Waldensian valleys (tab. 1). The Waldensian cases have shown that supporting foreign religious minorities was not just a matter of confessional solidarity, it was also highly political, both before and after 1648. One could even say that, under the right circumstances, such collections, or at least their proceeds, became an instrument of foreign policy. Of course, relief was provided only to fellow believers, which makes it confessional in nature. Yet by reducing transnational aid to foreign fellow believers to confessional engagement, we miss the point that it was in fact a multifaceted and complex process, involving both religious and secular arguments and institutions.